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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is joint work with Dan Bern-
hardt. We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly, and
bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first sup-
pose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal
to the asset’s stand-alone value to the seller. Demarzo et al. (2005) establish that with a
fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues.
Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry,
further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal
reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.
In the second essay, I consider a situation in which a winning bidder of an equity
auction has an investment opportunity after the auction and the seller has private infor-
mation about the return of the post-auction investment. I show that in such a situation,
in contrast to the seminal “linkage principle” by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the seller’s
expected revenue may be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than
when committing to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it
is positive or negative.
The third essay is joint work with Keiichi Kawai. The securitization of structured fi-
nance products entails three types of inefficiency: the issuer’s moral hazard when screen-
ing underlying assets (ex-ante inefficiency), the issuer’s incentive to repackage under-
lying assets into separate securities even when doing so is socially inefficient (interim
ii
inefficiency), and adverse selection in the market (ex-post inefficiency). To analyze the
interplay of these inefficiencies and their welfare implications, we consider a situation
wherein buying medium-value assets and issuing medium-value securities are first-best.
However, we show that the issuer not only buys low-value underlying assets but also
repackages underlying assets to issue two types of securities of different values despite
paying a socially wasteful cost.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid
Auctions.
1.1 Introduction
DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) (hereafter, DKS) characterize expected seller rev-
enues for general classes of security bid auctions—auctions whose payouts depend on
both the security that is bid by the winner of the auction, and the ultimate (stochastic)
payoff of the asset won by the bidder. DKS consider a setting where ex-ante symmet-
ric bidders receive i.i.d. signals of the private value of the asset to them if they win the
auction. DKS establish that auctions using steeper securities—those whose payments to
the seller are more tightly tied to the private valuation of the winning bidder—provide
the seller with greater expected revenues. Thus, call options provide greater expected
revenues than equity, which, in turn, provides greater expected revenues than debt.
We extend their analysis to a setting where it is costly for a potential bidder to partic-
ipate in the security-bid auction. Potential bidders know their private valuations when
deciding whether to enter. A potential bidder will only participate if the expected payoffs
from winning given its signal cover its participation costs; and those expected payoffs
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will depend on the class of securities used. A natural conjecture is that since auctions that
use steeper securities for payments provide the seller greater expected revenues, it must
be that using steeper securities attracts fewer bidders—as more revenues for the seller
would seemingly imply less for the winning bidder. Indeed, Gorbenko and Malenko
(2011) show that this is what happens when bidders choose which of many ex ante iden-
tical auctions to enter before learning about their valuations of the goods being auctioned.
Our paper shows that the opposite is true when bidders know their valuations before de-
ciding whether to participate in a single auction: not only do steeper securities extract
more revenues from any given set of bidders, but they also attract more bidders, and this
increased entry enhances revenue extraction from bidders.
We consider a seller seeking to sell an asset in an open outcry security-bid auction
design.1 Potential bidders receive their signals, and must then weigh whether it is worth-
while to participate in the auction given its security-bid design. Participation demands
nontrivial resources—bid preparation costs, time costs, and so on. In addition, we allow
for the possibility that the expected net value of the asset with the potential bidder could
be less than the stand-alone value to the seller; i.e., “synergies” could be negative.
Because potential bidders with low signals will choose not to participate—and a seller
regrets an outcome in which a bidder with negative private valuations wins—the seller
must specify a reserve security that a bidder pays with when it is the sole auction par-
ticipant. This reserve security is the minimum security-bid accepted by the seller. As a
benchmark, we first assume that the reserve security is set so that the seller’s expected
revenues given a single bidder equal its stand-alone value. A natural interpretation of
this reserve security is that the asset is being sold as a result of bankruptcy. The seller,
perhaps the firm’s trustee, cannot reject a bid that is expected to have a higher value than
the asset’s stand-alone value—and this pins down the reserve security.
1We pose our analysis in an open outcry auction rather than a second-price auction largely to deal with
semantics following a single entrant. With a single entrant, the winning bid in an open outcry auction will
be the reserve security. Modulo this distinction, our analysis extends to a second-price auction in which
bidders know how many others participate in the auction.
2
Potential bidders enter the auction if and only if their private signals are sufficiently
high. The marginal auction participant knows that it will win the auction only if it is
the sole entrant. Thus, the expected payoffs that it retains when it pays with the reserve
security just compensate for its participation costs.
Our central result is that a security-bid design that features steeper securities attracts
more entry. The reasoning behind the seemingly paradoxical result that steeper securities
both extract more from winning bidders and attract more entry is as follows. The seller
sets the reserve security to break even (relative to its stand-alone value) conditional on the
information that only one bidder participates in the auction—that is, conditional on the
winner’s type being better than the marginal type who is indifferent to entry. Thus, con-
ditional on a single bidder, the seller expects the same revenues regardless of the security
design.
However, precisely because payments of steeper securities are more strongly linked to
a private valuation of the winning bidder, extracting more revenues from bidders with
higher valuations, when the reserve security breaks even, the seller expects to extract less
revenues from bidders with lower valuations. Thus, the steeper is the security design,
the less the marginal auction participant expects to pay with the reserve security. Hence,
the steeper is the security design, the more willing are bidders with lower valuations to
participate.
One might then conjecture that because the marginal entering bidder might have a
negative private valuation, this extra entry could harm the seller; i.e., steeper security de-
signs could result in lower expected revenues. This conjecture is also false. Once entry
occurs, participation costs are sunk, and a bidder has a weakly dominant strategy to drop
out when the expected payoffs that it would retain just equal its stand-alone value (now
reduced by the participation costs). Moreover, because each auction participant expects
to make enough payoffs to cover participation costs, it must be willing to pay above the
reserve security; otherwise, it would be better off not participating. Hence, with multiple
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entrants, all losing bidders drop out at security bids above the reserve security. Thus,
the greater entry with steeper securities increases the expected revenues that the seller
extracts whenever there are multiple bidders. It follows that the greater auction revenues
generated by steeper securities are further enhanced when auction participation is endo-
genized in this way.
This logic is only reinforced when we compare auctions ordered by steepness that em-
ploy reserve securities of a fixed given expected value that exceed the seller’s stand-alone
value: steeper securities always attract more low-valuation bidders, and this greater par-
ticipation yields the seller higher expected revenues. Indeed, when the value of reserve
securities exceeds the seller’s stand-alone value, rather than being indifferent between
auction designs conditional on attracting zero vs. one bidder, in expectation, the seller
strictly prefers to attract one bidder rather than none, and steeper securities raise this
probability. It follows directly that an auction using steeper securities and associated op-
timal reserve security always yields the seller higher expected payoffs than an auction
using less steep securities and its associated optimal reserve security.
Our paper contributes to the security-bid auction literature (see a review by Skrzy-
pacz (2013)). Hansen (1985) is the first to show that equity auctions yield higher ex-
pected revenues than standard cash auctions. DKS extend this result to a general class
of security-bid auctions, establishing that the greater is the linkage between a bidder’s
private information and the expected payment he would make upon winning, the higher
is the expected revenue that a seller receives (Milgrom and Weber (1982)). Other papers
that study security-bid auctions include Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000), Che and
Kim (2010), Kogan and Morgan (2010), Abhishek, Hajek, and Williams (2015) and Liu
(2015).
Our paper is most closely related in spirit to Gorbenko and Malenko (2011). They en-
dogenize competition in auction design of simultaneous second-price security-bid auc-
tions between a finite number of sellers. Potential bidders make entry decisions based on
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the auction designs, but not knowing their private valuations of the stochastically iden-
tical objects being auctioned. The opportunity cost to a bidder of participating in one
auction is not participating in another. In this setting, steeper security designs extract
more from a given number of bidders, but flatter security designs draw more bidders
precisely because steeper securities extract more from bidders. The equilibrium security
design typically trades off between these two considerations.
We consider a seemingly similar notion of endogenous entry to a security-bid auc-
tion. However, our findings are diametrically opposed. Our setting features a single
auction—rather than entry being endogenous due to the opportunity cost of participat-
ing in one auction rather than another, entry is endogenous because participation itself is
costly. Quite crucially and differently from Gorbenko and Malenko (2011), bidders know
their private valuations before deciding whether to participate. We show that with this
structure, when the reserve security has a fixed expected value, the steeper is the secu-
rity design, the greater is entry—a seller does not need to tradeoff between extractingmore
from a winning bidder and attracting more entry—and the greater are expected revenues.
Fishman (1989) builds a sequential entrymodel inwhich, in equilibrium, low-valuation
bidders use securities and high-valuation bidders use cash. Bidders signal a high value
by bidding with cash to preempt competition. Although he too considers entry, his focus
is on preemptive bids. In contrast, we focus on the relationship between rent extraction
and entry, and revenue comparisons across security-bid auctions.
We next present the model. A brief conclusion follows.
1.2 Model
We modify the framework of DKS by introducing an entry decision by risk-neutral bid-
ders to an open outcry security-bid auction held by a risk-neutral seller. There are n
ex-ante identical potential bidders. A bidder incurs cost φ > 0 if it participates in the
5
auction. Each bidder has a stand-alone value of vB > φ, which means that a bidder has
enough resources to participate in the auction. The asset being auctioned has a stand-
alone value to the seller of v. If bidder i acquires the asset, it will yield a stochastic payoff
of Zi at date 2.
At date 0, each potential bidder i receives a private signal Θi of the incremental value
of the asset to the bidder. Conditional on the asset being acquired by bidder i of type
Θi = θ, the expected value of Zi is normalized to
E (Zi|Θi = θ) = vB + v+ θ − φ,
where Zi is i.i.d. according to a density h (·|θ)with full support on [0,∞). We assume that
the family {h (·|θ)} has the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (sMLRP): h (z|θ) /h (z|θ′)
is increasing in z for θ > θ′. That is, higher signals are good news.
The signals Θi are distributed i.i.d. according to a distribution F (·) with full support
over
[
θ, θ
]
. We assume that this support satisfies θ < φ < θ¯. Thus, the net value of the
asset to the bidder may or may not exceed its stand-alone value to the seller. In particular,
θ¯ > φ means that it is efficient to allocate the asset to a potential bidder with a high
private valuation. One can interpret an acquisition by type θ > φ as generating a value-
enhancing synergy with an expected value of θ − φ. Conversely, it is not efficient for
potential bidders with low valuations θ < φ to participate in the auction—it would be
better for the seller to retain the asset. Note that our formulation allows for the possibility
that θ < 0. That is, not only may “synergies” fail to cover auction participation costs, but
they may be negative in nature.
After receiving their private signals, potential bidders simultaneously decide at date 1
whether to participate in a security-bid auction (S , s (S)) for the asset. (S , s (S)) spec-
ifies a set of feasible bids S and a reserve security s (S). Bids are made in the form
of securities that are contingent on the stochastic payoff Zi, which is realized at date 2.
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The reserve security s (S) is the minimum bid accepted under S ; this security is pinned
down via a break-even condition that we describe below. We slightly modify DKS’s no-
tion of ordered securities. Let S (s, z) denote the payment to the seller when Zi = z is
the payoff realized at date 2 for security s. Bids are restricted to an ordered set of feasi-
ble securities S = {S (s, ·) : s ∈ [s (S) , s]} such that (i) for all s, S (s, z) and z− S (s, z) are
weakly increasing in z, satisfying 0 ≤ S (s, z) ≤ z, and (ii) ∂ES (s, θ) /∂s > 0 for all θ, and
ES
(
s, θ
) ≥ v+ θ, where ES (s, θ) ≡ E (S (s,Zi) |Θi = θ) is the expected value of security
S (s, ·) conditional on Θi = θ.
At date 2, the asset payoff Zi = z is realized and payments are made as follows: when
bidder i is the sole entrant, i wins the auction if and only if it submits a feasible bid; i.e.,
its bid si weakly exceeds the reserve security s (S), paying S(si, z). When two or more
bidders submit feasible bids, the winning bidder i pays with the security bid s2 of the last
bidder to drop out of the auction, paying S
(
s2, z
)
.
We use the notion of steepness introduced in DKS: an ordered set of securities SA is
steeper than SB if for all SA ∈ SA, SB ∈ SB, sA ∈ [s (SA) , sA], and sB ∈ [s (SB) , sB],
ESA (sA, θ∗) = ESB (sB, θ∗) implies ∂ESA (sA, θ∗) /∂θ > ∂ESB (sB, θ∗) /∂θ. Steeper secu-
rities imply that if a bidder with a private valuation θ∗ expects to pay the same amount
with securities sA and sB, then a bidder with a higher private valuation θ > θ∗ expects
to pay strictly more with the steeper security sA than with sB. Thus, the payment of the
steeper security is tied more tightly to the winning bidder’s private valuation.
We first consider bidding decisions conditional on entry, i.e., on paying the participa-
tion cost φ. The logic in Proposition 1 of DKS yields the following results.2
• If a bidder i with type Θi = θ is the sole entrant, it has a dominant strategy to bid
s (S) if ES (s (S) , θ) ≤ v+ θ; and not to bid if ES (s (S) , θ) > v+ θ.
• With multiple bidders, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder i of type Θi = θ
2Identical characterizations obtain for second-price auctions where auction participants know how
many bidders participate, and a single bidder pays the reserve.
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to drop out at the bid s∗ (θ) such that ES (s∗ (θ) , θ) = v+ θ. Further, s∗ (·) increases
in θ.
• If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then conditional on the entry
of the highest and second-highest types, the expected equilibrium revenue to the
seller is greater under SA than under SB.
Next we consider the entry decisions of bidders a` la Samuelson (1985). Due to the
participation costs φ, not all potential bidders may enter. Since the equilibrium expected
payoff upon entry is increasing in θ for a given auction (S , s (S)), there must be some
cutoff θ (S) such that only bidders with θ ≥ θ (S) enter the auction. The marginal bidder
with type θ (S) is indifferent between participating or not. Moreover, bidder θ (S) wins
only if all other bidders are of type θ < θ (S); that is, bidder θ (S)wins only if no one else
enters. Therefore, the cutoff θ (S) solves:
[E (Zi|Θi = θ (S))− ES (s (S) , θ (S))] Fn−1 (θ (S))+ (vB − φ)
(
1− Fn−1 (θ (S))
)
= vB.
(1.1)
Lemma 1 s∗ (θ(S)) > s (S).
Proof. The left-hand side of (1.1) is decreasing in s (S) and would become vB − φ < vB if
we replaced s (S) with s∗ (θ (S)) . 
This result implies that on the equilibrium path, if multiple bidders enter the auction,
then the winning bidder will pay with a security bid that is at least s∗ (θ(S)), which is
strictly higher than s (S).
The seller accepts any bid that yields higher expected revenue than its stand-alone
value v. This premise fits well with bankruptcy auctions. When a bankruptcy trustee’s
valuation of the asset is v, the trustee cannot reject a bid that is thought to yield more than
v. In equilibrium, when there is a single bidder, that bidder bids s (S), and the seller only
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learns that the winning bidder’s type θ is at least θ (S). Thus, s (S) solves:
∫ θ
θ(S)
ES (s (S) , θ) F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (S)) = v. (1.2)
In an open outcry auction, when there is only one entrant, the seller learns only that the
sole entrant’s type is at least θ (S). These would also be the inferences that a seller would
draw in a second-price auction where a bidder knows howmany others are participating,
because a single bidder knows it will win and pay the reserve regardless of what bid
(above the reserve) he submits. In particular, these would be the inferences drawn if a
single bidder always bids the reserve.
A bidder’s break-even condition (1.1) can be rewritten as
φ = [v+ θ (S)− ES (s (S) , θ (S))] Fn−1 (θ (S)) . (1.3)
That is, the expected payoff from participation must at least compensate for participation
costs. The right-hand side is increasing in θ (S), and from (1.2) it would become θ by
substituting θ for θ (S). Therefore, the assumption that entry costs are not prohibitive,
i.e., φ < θ, ensures that θ(S) < θ¯ holds for all S , i.e., a bidder enters with strictly positive
probability.3
We now establish that more entry occurs when bids are paid with steeper securities.
Proposition 2 Suppose the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB. Then auction (SA, s(SA))
attracts more entry than auction (SB, s(SB)): θ (SA) < θ (SB).
Proof. Let s (SA) and s (SB) be the reserve securities under SA and SB, respectively. By
way of contradiction, first suppose θ (SA) = θ (SB) = θ˜. Then,
∫ θ
θ˜
ESA (s (SA) , θ) F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜) = ∫ θ
θ˜
ESB (s (SB) , θ) F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜) (1.4)
3Note that θ (S) may be negative—a bidder with negative synergies may enter when the surplus asso-
ciated with high-valuation bidders is sufficiently large.
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must hold to satisfy (1.2). Also, using (1.1) yields ESA
(
s (SA) , θ˜
)
= ESB
(
s (SB) , θ˜
)
,
which, together with the definition of steepness, implies that
∫ θ
θ˜
ESA (s (SA) , θ) F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜) > ∫ θ
θ˜
ESB (s (SB) , θ) F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜) ,
a contradiction to (1.4). Next suppose θ (SA) > θ (SB). Then, it follows that
∫ θ
θ(SA)
ESB (s (SB) , θ) F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SA)) >
∫ θ
θ(SB)
ESB (s (SB) , θ) F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SB))
(1.5)
=
∫ θ
θ(SA)
ESA (s (SA) , θ) F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SA)) ,
where the equality holds by (1.2). This, together with the definition of steepness, im-
plies ESB (s (SB) , θ (SA)) > ESA (s (SA) , θ (SA)); otherwise, the left-hand side of (1.5)
would become smaller, a contradiction. Let U(s
(Sj) , θ) denote a type θ’s expected pay-
off when the reserve security is s
(Sj) for j = A, B. Then, since ESB (s (SB) , θ (SA)) >
ESA (s (SA) , θ (SA)),
U(s (SA) , θ (SA)) > U(s (SB) , θ (SA))
> U(s (SB) , θ (SB))
= U(s (SA) , θ (SA)),
a contradiction, where the last inequality holds by θ (SA) > θ (SB) and the equality holds
by (1.1). Therefore, θ (SA) < θ (SB) .
To establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes, we show that there is
a unique s and θ that solve the system of equations, (2) and (3). Let s (θ) be the reserve
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security associated with a cutoff type θ; i.e.,
∫ θ
θ
ES
(
s (θ) , θ′
)
F
(
dθ′|θ′ ≥ θ) = v,
for those θ large enough that such a security exists. Then, s (θ) is decreasing and con-
tinuous in θ. Similarly, let θˆ (s (θ)) be the cutoff type for reserve security s (θ) who is
indifferent about participation; i.e.,
φ =
[
v+ θˆ (s (θ))− ES (s (θ) , θˆ (s (θ)))] Fn−1 (θˆ (s (θ))) .
Then, θˆ (·) is increasing and continuous in its argument. Therefore, θˆ (s (θ)) is decreasing
and continuous in θ. We have already established that θˆ
(
s
(
θ
))
< θ, and φ > θ implies
that θˆ (s (θ)) > θ, so that we have θ < θˆ (s (θ)) < θ. Therefore, there exists a unique fixed
point that characterizes the equilibrium. 
To see the intuition for this result, observe that regardless of the class of securities, the
reserve security breaks even for the seller—the seller’s expected revenues when there is a
single bidder are the same regardless of the class of securities. However, steeper securities
extract a greater share of its revenues from bidders with higher valuations. It follows
that steeper securities extract less from bidders with lower valuations. In particular, the
steeper is the security design, the less themarginal auction participant expects to paywith
the reserve security. Hence, the steeper is the security design, the more willing bidders
with lower valuations are to participate—for any realization of bidder signals, auction
(SA, s(SA)) attracts at least as many entrants as auction (SB, s(SB)).
Note that the seller would prefer to retain the asset (in expectation) whenever the
marginal auction participant is the sole bidder; and, indeed, the marginal participant’s
private valuation could even be negative. One might therefore think that because a
steeper security design draws more participants with low valuations, it might reduce
expected seller revenues. Proposition 3 shows that this is not so:
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Proposition 3 If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then for any set of signal
realizations, {θi}ni=1, auction (SA, s (SA)) has at least as much entry as (SB, s (SB)). Moreover,
• If auction (SA, s (SA)) attracts multiple entrants, then it yields the seller higher expected
revenue than (SB, s (SB)).
• If auction (SA, s (SA)) attracts zero or one entrant, then it yields the seller the same expected
revenue as (SB, s (SB)).
Proof. Let θ2 be the second-highest type. By Proposition 2, there are three cases: θ2 ≤
θ (SA), θ2 ∈ (θ (SA) , θ (SB)] and θ2 > θ (SB). When θ2 ≤ θ (SA), at most one bidder
enters for both auctions. Then, the seller expects to receive v in both auctions. When
θ2 ∈ (θ (SA) , θ (SB)], at least two bidders enter for (SA, s (SA)) yielding a strictly higher
revenue than v by Lemma 1, while at most one bidder enters for (SB, s (SB)) yielding a
revenue of v. When θ2 > θ (SB), at least two bidders enter both auctions. Then, it follows
from DKS that the seller receives higher revenue in the auction with (SA, s (SA)) . 
Thus, the greater entry to auctions with steeper securities reinforces their revenue-
enhancing advantages.
More generally, the logic underlying Propositions 2 and 3 carries over for any reserve
security of a fixed given value that exceeds the seller’s value as a stand-alone entity. Sup-
pose that the reserve security sˆ (S) solves:
∫ θ
θ(S)
ES (sˆ (S) , θ) F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (S)) = vˆ ∈ (v, v+ θ¯ − φ). (1.6)
We now establish that more entry occurs when bids are paid with steeper securities.
Proposition 4 If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then auction (SA, sˆ(SA))
attracts more entry than (SB, sˆ(SB)): θ (SA) < θ (SB). Moreover,
• If auction (SA, sˆ (SA)) either attracts multiple entrants or more entrants than (SB, sˆ (SB)),
then it yields the seller higher expected revenue.
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• If auctions (SA, sˆ (SA)) and (SB, sˆ (SB)) both attract zero entrants or both attract one
entrant, then they yield the seller the same expected revenue.
We omit the proof because it mirrors those for Propositions 2 and 3. Once more, for
any reserve security of a fixed value vˆ ∈ (v, v + θ¯ − φ), the steeper is the security, the
greater is the expected portion of that fixed value that comes from high-valuation bidders.
That is, the steeper is the security, the smaller is the expected portion of that fixed value
that comes from low-valuation bidders. Therefore, steeper securities attract more low-
valuation bidders. In turn, this increased participation generates higher expected payoffs
for the seller. Indeed, a stronger result obtains, because when the steeper security design
attracts a single entrant but no entry occurs with the less steep security design, with the
steeper security design, the seller now expects revenues that exceed its stand-alone value
since vˆ > v. We now establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the seller faces no constraints on the reserve security that it sets for a given
class of securities, with the optimal reserve security, the steeper is the security-bid design, the
greater are the seller’s expected revenues.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that for a given value of the reserve (including
the optimal reserve for the less steep security design), expected revenues are higher with
the steeper security design (even though the value of that reserve security need not be the
optimal one for the steeper security design. 
1.3 Conclusion
We endogenize entry to security-bid auctions, by introducing a cost to participation. We
first consider a scenario where, with a single entrant, the minimum security bid accepted
is pinned down by a break-even (indifference) condition for the seller. Counterintuitively,
we establish that security-bid auctions that use steeper securities for payment, which gen-
erate greater expected revenues for the seller for a fixed number of bidders, also make
13
bidders with worse signals more willing to participate. We show that even when the
marginal participant has a negative private valuation, this increased participation rein-
forces the revenue superiority of such auctions.
We extend this logic to any reserve security of a fixed given value that exceeds the
seller’s stand-alone value: steeper securities attract more low-valuation bidders, and in-
creased participation by low-valuation bidders yields the seller higher expected revenues.
Furthermore, an auction using steeper securities that sets its optimal reserve security
yields higher expected revenues than the one using less steep securities that sets its opti-
mal reserve security.
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Chapter 2
Seller’s Information Disclosure Policy in
Equity Auctions with Post-Auction
Investment Opportunities
2.1 Introduction
According to the seminal “linkage principle” by Milgrom and Weber (1982), a seller can
enhance auction revenues by publicly disclosing her private information regarding the
value of the good being auctioned. However, this paper shows that, in an auction with
certain attributes, the seller may receive higher revenue when not revealing any private
information at all than when committing to reveal information publicly regardless of
whether it is positive or negative.
The attributes are as follows: (i) instead of making cash bids, bidders make equity
offers detailing the share the seller can claim on future cash flows generated by the good
being auctioned (i.e., equity or royalty auctions), (ii) the winning bidder has post-auction
investment opportunities, and (iii) the seller has private information about the return of
the post-auction investment prior to the auction.
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Prototypical examples of auctions with the attributes (i) – (iii) are oil and gas lease
auctions and corporate takeover contests. In oil and gas lease auctions, a winning bidder
makes royalty payment based on production from the lease, and he must choose how
much to invest once he acquires the lease. Moreover, the seller has some private informa-
tion that helps bidders to estimate the value of the tract due to independently exploring
the tract prior to the auction. Alternatively, many merger and acquisition deals are paid
with stock, and an acquirer must choose how much to invest after the deal. Moreover,
it is likely that a target firm has some private information that can help bidding firms
estimate to determine the target’s future profitability. In such situations, it is imperative
to the seller whether she can benefit by making her private information public.
In equity auctions, bidders are susceptible to a moral hazard problem. If a winning
bidder must pay a large fraction of future cashflow generated by the auctioned asset, he
has less incentive to make a costly investment in the asset after the auction.
The key intuition behind our counter-example to the linkage principle is that new in-
formation affects bidders with different productivity differently who are under the moral
hazard problem. In our paper we consider a second-price equity auction in which a win-
ner pays according to the second highest bid. When the second most productive bidder
is extremely productive or unproductive, his bid will be so high or low that no new in-
formation affects the winning bidder’s investment decision. However, when the second
most productive bidder is moderately productive, the new information revealed by the
seller will intensify the moral hazard problem faced by the winner. If instead the second
most productive bidder is moderately unproductive, the new information will mitigate
the moral hazard problem. Therefore, depending on distributions of productivity among
bidders, the seller may be better off concealing her private information.
There are a number of papers which show that, under a certain setting, revealing more
information does not necessarily enhance a seller’s revenue. Perry and Reny (1999) con-
sider a multi-unit auction setting. Fang and Parreiras (2003) consider a situation when
16
bidders are financially constrained. Mares and Harstad (2003) consider a situation in
which a seller can privately reveal information to a certain set of bidders. Bergemann
and Pesendorfer (2007) consider a multiple-signal setting. However, to my knowledge, in
all of these research, the reason why revealing more information may lower the seller’s
revenue is that information disclosure has an allocation effect; that is, as Board (2009)
points out, “the new information can change the order of bidders’ valuations.” This cur-
rent paper not only offers another situation in which the linkage principle does not hold,
but also considers a situation in which new information does not change the order of
bidders’ valuations.
Kogan and Morgan (2010) also analyze equity auctions with post-auction investment
opportunities, and show that a moral hazard problem arising from equity payment un-
dermines an incentive to invest and thus the resulting revenue may be lower than that
of the corresponding debt auction.1 However, they do not consider a seller’s information
disclosure policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model.
Section 2.3 derives the equilibrium strategies. Section 2.4 compares the revenues from
two different policies: publicly revealing the seller’s private information regardless of
whether it is positive or negative, and not revealing at all. Section 2.5 concludes. Most of
the proofs are delegated to Section 2.6.
2.2 The Model
A seller (female) uses the second-price equity auction to sell a single indivisible asset to
at most one of N ≥ 2 bidders (male).2 If bidder i acquires the asset, it generates cashflow
1Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1992) consider the same issue of royalty payments in a non-
rigorous manner.
2Our model specification follows the equity auction model in Kogan and Morgan (2010). However, our
model has an additional information structure created by a signal w ∈ {G, B} concerning the profitability
of the post-auction investment.
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Zi. Each bidder bids a fraction αi ∈ (0, 1) and the highest bidder acquires the asset.
The winning bidder i pays α2Zi to the seller while he retains
(
1− α2) Zi, where α2 is the
second-highest bid. Both the seller and bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral.
Prior to the auction, the seller receives a private signal w ∈ {G, B} concerning the
profitability of the asset with a probability q of G. Also, bidder i has private information
about his productivity vi ∈ [v, v], where vi is distributed according to the distribution
function Fi on [v, v]. Note that vi’s can be dependently and asymmetrically distributed.
Upon winning the auction, bidder i must make an initial investment x0 > 0, which is
common and known to all the bidders prior to the auction. Once the initial investment is
made, bidder i observes the signal w ∈ {G, B} that the seller received before the auction.
We can interpret w as the sort of information that can be obtained only after actually
acquiring the asset. After observing the signal w, the winner has an opportunity to make
an additional investment x ∈ {0, 1}.3 Note that, upon making the additional investment
decision, the winner knows the signal w regardless of the seller’s information disclosure
policies. If bidder i with productivity vi wins the auction and chooses the additional
investment x ∈ {0, 1} upon receiving the signal w ∈ {G, B}, cashflow Zi generated by the
asset is
Zi =
 vi + βx with a probability of pw0 with a probability of (1− pw),
where pG > pB and pBβ > 1. Note that, by pBβ > 1, it is socially efficient for any winner
to choose x = 1 regardless of the signal w ∈ {G, B}. Also, we assume that
pBv > x0,
3The assumption of discrete investment is not crutial to the results of this paper. Using continuous
investment model with a convex cost function yields qualitatively the same results.
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so that ex-post efficiency requires that trade occur even when a bidder with the lowest
productivity vwins the auction andmakes no additional investment x = 0 after receiving
the bad signal B.
In what follows, we will compare two information disclosure policies: D and ND.
(D) Prior to the auction, the seller commits to publicly disclose the signal w she receives,
regardless of whether it is G or B.
(ND) Prior to the auction, the seller commits not to disclose the signal w at all.
The timing of the events is summarized as follows:
1. The seller commits to one of the policies: D or ND.
2. The seller receives a signal w ∈ {G, B}. She publicly reveals w if D is chosen in
1 and does not reveal w if ND is chosen in 1. Each bidder receives a productivity
signal vi.
3. The second-price equity auction takes place: the highest bidder iwins and he learns
the second-highest bid α2 ∈ (0, 1) .
4. The winning bidder i makes the initial investment x0 and learns the signal w that is
identical to what the seller received in 2.
5. Thewinning bidder i chooseswhether tomake the additional investment x ∈ {0, 1} .
6. Cashflow Zi is realized and the winning bidder i pays α2Zi to the seller and retains(
1− α2) Zi.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Let pˆ ≡ qpG + (1− q) pB be the ex-ante expected probability of success, and let ∆p ≡
pG − pB. Let pi
(
v,w, α2, x
)
be the expected payoff of a winning bidder with productivity
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v when he receives a signal w ∈ {G, B}, the second-highest bid is α2, and he makes the
additional investment x ∈ {0, 1}; that is, define
pi
(
v,w, α2, x
)
≡
(
1− α2
)
pw (v+ βx)− x0 − x.
Moreover, let
pi
(
v,w, α2
)
≡ max
{
pi
(
v,w, α2, 0
)
,pi
(
v,w, α2, 1
)}
denote the equilibrium payoff of a winning bidder with productivity v given w ∈ {G, B}
and the second-highest bid α2. pi
(
v,w, α2
)
manifests that there is a moral hazard problem.
Although it is socially efficient to additionally invest even when w = B, large equity
payment α2 undermines the incentive to invest. Since the expected amount of cashflow
from the asset is increasing in a bidder’s productivity, a more productive bidder submits
a higher bid. However, each bidder must take into account how bidding high will affect
the post-auction investment choice. This consideration leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in the second-price equity auc-
tion with the post-auction investment is for a bidder with productivity v to bid
α (v) =

1− x0pˆv if v > pGx0βpˆ
1− x0+qpˆv+qpGβ if v ∈
(
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ ,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
1− x0+1pˆ(v+β) if v <
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ
when the seller chooses ND, and to bid
α (v,w) =
 1−
x0
pwv if v > x0β
1− x0+1pw(v+β) if v < x0β
when the seller chooses D. Furthermore, given the signal w ∈ {G, B} and the second-highest bid
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α2, the equilibrium additional investment strategy for the winning bidder with productivity v is
x
(
v,w, α2
)
=
 1 if α
2 ≤ 1− 1pwβ
0 otherwise.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
The equilibrium additional investment strategy x
(
v,w, α2
)
manifests itself in a moral
hazard problem. When the winning bidder must pay a large fraction α2 of cashflow from
the asset, he does not have an incentive to invest. A more productive bidder submits a
higher bid, and thereby the incentive to make the post-auction investment is undermined.
As a result, he must adjust his conditional expected payoff upon winning accordingly.
More specifically, suppose that the seller does not disclose her private information.
A bidder with a large private signal v > pGx0βpˆ bids so high that he would make no ad-
ditional investment regardless of the signal w should he win and pay his own bid. A
bidder with an intermediate private signal v ∈
(
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ ,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
bids so that he would
make the additional investment only when w = G should he win and pay his own bid.
A bidder with a small private signal v < (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ bids so small that he would make
the additional investment regardless of the signal w should he win and pay his own bid.
Similarly, suppose the seller discloses her private information w ∈ {G, B}. Then, a bidder
with a large signal v > x0β bids so high that he would make no additional investment
should he win and pay his own bid. However, a bidder with a small signal v < x0β bids
so small that he would make the additional investment should he win and pay his own
bid.
Moreover, the following corollary immediately follows from the above proposition.
Corollary 7 The equilibrium bidding strategies α (v) and α (v,w) are strictly increasing and
continuous in productivity v.
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This corollary implies that the most productive bidder always wins regardless of
whether the seller chooses D or ND; that is, information revealed by the seller does not
change the allocation rule, in contrast to the existing papers that offer counter-examples
to the linkage principle.
2.4 Revenue Comparison
Instead of comparing the ex-ante expected revenues, let us compare the interim expected
revenues under the two different disclosure policies ND and D by taking the highest pri-
vate signal v1 and the second highest signal v2 as given. This allows us to analyze without
any assumption on distribution functions {Fi}i∈{1,...,N} of signals {vi}i∈{1,...,N}. The next
proposition provides our key result, which suggests that choosing ND can yield a higher
ex-ante expected revenue than choosing D for some given distributions {Fi}i∈{1,...,N} of
signals {vi}i∈{1,...,N} and some given number N of bidders.
Proposition 8 Given the realized highest private signal v1 and second highest signal v2, we can
rank the interim expected revenues under the two information disclosure policies ND and D as
follows:
1. When v2 is extremely large; that is, v2 ≥ pGx0βpˆ , the second-price equity auction with post-
auction investment yields the same interim expected revenue regardless of the seller’s infor-
mation disclosure policies.
2. When v2 is moderately large; that is, v2 ∈
(
x0β,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
, ND leads to a higher interim
expected revenue than D.
3. When v2 is moderately small; that is, v2 ∈
(
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ , x0β
)
, ND leads to a higher
interim expected revenue than D if v1 − v2 > ∆vˆ; otherwise, D leads to a higher interim
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expected revenue than ND, where
∆vˆ ≡ (pBβ− 1) (v2 + β) ( pˆv2 + qpGβ)
pˆv2 − (pBx0 − q∆p) β .
4. When v2 is extremely small; that is, when v2 ≤ (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ , the second-price equity auction
with post-auction investment yields the same interim expected revenue regardless of the
seller’s information disclosure policies.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
First, note that, unlike cash auctions, the amount of revenue in equity auctions de-
pends not only on the bid, but also on the realized cashflow generated by the asset being
auctioned. When v2 is extremely large, the second-highest bidder with productivity v2
bids so high regardless of the seller’s information disclosure policies that the winning
bidder has no incentive to make the additional investment regardless of w ∈ {G, B}. Sim-
ilarly, when v2 is extremely small, the second-highest bidder with productivity v2 bids
so low regardless of the seller’s information disclosure policies that the winning bidder
makes the additional investment regardless of w ∈ {G, B}. Notice that, when v2 is ex-
tremely large (small), the second-highest bid is made in anticipation to choose x = 0
(x = 1) regardless of the signal w should he win and pay his own bid, while the type-
v1 chooses x = 0 (x = 1) regardless of the signal w. In other word, when v2 is extremely
large or extremely small, the seller’s information disclosure policies do not affect the equi-
librium bid and the investment decision. Consequently, they do not affect the seller’s
revenues.
Consider a case in which v2 is moderately large: v2 ∈ (x0β, pGx0β/ pˆ). Then, his bid is
also moderately large so that the following is satisfied:
1− 1
pBβ
< α (v2, B) < α (v2) < 1− 1pGβ < α (v2,G) .
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This implies that the additional investment is made only when w = G under ND while
no additional investment is made regardless of w under D. Consequently, the expected
cashflow of the asset is higher under ND. Moreover, type-v2 bids more aggressively
under ND:
pˆα (v2) > qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) .
Therefore, ND yields a higher interim expected revenue.
Consider a case in which v2 is moderately small: v2 ∈ ((pBx0 − q∆p) β/ pˆ, x0β). Then,
his bid is also moderately small so that the following is satisfied:
α (v2, B) < 1− 1pBβ < α (v2) < α (v2,G) < 1−
1
pGβ
.
This implies that the additional investment is made only when w = G under ND while
the additional investment is made regardless of w under D. Consequently, the expected
cashflow from the asset is higher under D. However, the type-v2 bids more aggressively
under ND:
pˆα (v2) > qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) .
Thus, ND results in smaller expected cashflow but a more aggressive bid. The latter effect
impacts more on the seller’s revenue as v1 increases. As a result, for sufficiently large v1,
the latter effect dominates the former, and therefore ND leads to a higher interim expected
revenue.
Noting that the above argument is made by taking the realized highest signal v1 and
second highest signal v2 as given, let us consider the ex-ante optimality of D and ND.
Proposition 8 implies that, when v < (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ or v >
pGx0β
pˆ , both N and ND yield the
same ex-ante expected revenue. Moreover, when v ∈
(
x0β,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
, ND yields a higher
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ex-ante expected revenue, regardless of the parameters and distribution functions.
However, when v < x0β, the ex-ante optimality of D and ND depends on the pa-
rameters (N, β, x0, pG, pB, q) and distributions {Fi}i∈{1,...,N} of signals {vi}i∈{1,...,N}. To
illustrate this, consider a case in which N = 2, q = 12 , pG =
3
4 , pB =
1
4 , x0 = 3 and vi is
independent and uniformly distributed over (15, 25). Figure 2.1 shows the ex-ante ex-
Figure 2.1: The ex-ante expected revenues under D and under ND (solid red line and
dashed red line, respectively) and the ex-ante expected probabilities of undertaking in-
vestment (x = 1) under D and under ND (solid blue line and dashed blue line, respec-
tively).
pected revenues under D and under ND (solid red line and dashed red line, respectively)
and the ex-ante expected probabilities of undertaking investment (x = 1) under D and
under ND (solid blue line and dashed blue line, respectively). For β < 7.08718, ND yields
a higher ex-ante expected revenue, and for β ∈ (7.08718, 25) , D yields a higher ex-ante
expected revenue. When β > 25, v < (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ holds; therefore, both N and ND yield
the same ex-ante expected revenue.
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Several remarks can be made concerning the ex-ante optimality based on Proposition
8. Suppose ND is ex-ante optimal. Then, transferring probability mass away from region
3 in Proposition 8 where v1 − v2 < ∆vˆ, under an assumption of conditional indepen-
dence, continues to make ND optimal. Transferring probability mass from region 1 or 4
in Proposition 8 to region 2 or 3 where v1 − v2 > ∆vˆ also continues to make ND optimal.
2.5 Conclusion
We consider equity auctions with the post-auction investment opportunities when a seller
has private information about the return of the post-auction investment. Then we show
that in such a situation, in contrast to the seminal linkage principle, the seller’s expected
revenuemay be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than when com-
mitting to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it is positive
or negative.
As noted earlier, unlike the existing literature, no new information changes the alloca-
tion rule in our model. The intuition behind our counter-example to the linkage principle
is that new information affects bidders with different productivity differently who are
under the moral hazard problem. When v2 is extremely large or small, his bid will be so
high or low that no new information affects the winning bidder’s investment decision.
However, when v2 is moderately large, the new information revealed by the seller will
intensify the moral hazard problem faced by the winner. On the other hand, when v2 is
moderately small, the new information will mitigate the moral hazard problem. Thus,
depending on a combination of the number of bidders and distributions of productivity
signals, the seller may be better off concealing her private information.
The policy implication of this paper is that a seller sometimes should not reveal her
private information about the profitability of the investment in equity/royalty auctions,
or equity/royalty auctions should not be adopted as an auction format in such a situation.
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2.6 Proofs of Chapter 2
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 6
In order to prove Proposition 6, first we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9 Suppose EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is continuous and non-increasing in α2 for any v and w.
Also, suppose that for any v and w there exists some αˆ such that EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is strictly
decreasing in α2 for any α2 < αˆ with EW [pi (v,w, 0)] > 0 and EW [pi (v,w, αˆ)] < 0. Then, in
the second-price equity auction with the post-auction investment, it is weakly dominant bidding
strategy for a bidder with productivity v to bid α (v) such that
EW [pi (v,w, α (v))] = 0.
Proof. First, by the continuity and strict monotonicity together with the boundary con-
ditions, the equilibrium bidding strategy α (v) is well defined. Let α′ be the highest com-
peting bid. By bidding α (v), bidder iwins and earns a positive payoff EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
if
α (v) > α′ and loses if α (v) < α′. Now, suppose bidder i bids α > α (v). If α2 > α > α (v),
then bidder i still loses. If α > α2 > α (v), then bidder i wins but earns a negative payoff
since EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is strictly decreasing, while had he bid α (v), he would have earned
zero. If α > α (v) > α2, then he still wins and earns the same payoff EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
.
Therefore, bidding α > α (v) is weakly dominated by α (v). Similarly, one can prove that
bidding α < α (v) is weakly dominated by α (v).
Lemma 10 EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is continuous and non-increasing in α2 for any v and w. Also, for
any v and w there exists some αˆ such that EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is strictly decreasing in α2 for any
α2 < αˆ with EW [pi (v,w, 0)] > 0 and EW [pi (v,w, αˆ)] < 0.
Proof. First, for any v and w, EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
is continuous and non-increasing in α2.
Also, EW [pi (v,w, 0)] > 0 by pBv > x0. Moreover, for a sufficiently large αˆ, we have
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EW [pi (v,w, αˆ)] < 0 and
EW
[
pi
(
v,w, α2
)]
=
(
1− α2
)
(qpG + (1− q) pB) v− x0
is strictly decreasing in α2 for any α2 < αˆ.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Now let us prove the latter statement of the proposition. The winning bidder makes
the additional investment if and only if
(
1− α2
)
pw (v+ β)− x0 − 1 ≥
(
1− α2
)
pwv− x0
or α2 ≤ 1− 1pwβ .
Next, let us prove the equilibrium bidding strategy α (v) when the seller does not
disclose her private information. First suppose v > pGx0βpˆ . Then
α (v) = 1− x0
pˆv
> 1− 1
pGβ
,
and hence x (v,w, α (v)) = 0 for any w ∈ {G, B}. It follows that
qpi (v,G, α (v)) + (1− q)pi (v, B, α (v)) = pˆ (1− α (v)) v− x0
= 0,
and therefore by Lemma 9 and 10, α (v) is the equilibrium bidding strategy.
Suppose v ∈
(
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ ,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
. Then
α (v) = 1− x0 + q
pˆv+ qpGβ
∈
(
1− 1
pBβ
, 1− 1
pGβ
)
,
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and hence x (v,G, α (v)) = 1 and x (v, B, α (v)) = 0. It follows that
qpi (v,G, α (v)) + (1− q)pi (v, B, α (v)) = (1− α (v)) ( pˆv+ qpGβ)− x0 − q
= 0,
and therefore by Lemma 9 and 10, α (v) is the equilibrium bidding strategy.
Suppose v < (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ . Then
α (v) = 1− x0 + 1
pˆ (v+ β)
< 1− 1
pBβ
,
and hence x (v,w, α (v)) = 1 for any w ∈ {G, B}. It follows that
qpi (v,G, α (v)) + (1− q)pi (v, B, α (v)) = (1− α (v)) pˆ (v+ β)− x0 − 1
= 0,
and therefore by Lemma 9 and 10, α (v) is the equilibrium bidding strategy.
We can similarly prove the equilibrium bidding strategy α (v,w) when the seller dis-
closes her private information w ∈ {G, B}. 
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 8
First, since pB < pˆ < pG, the following parametric relationship holds:
(pBx0 − q∆p) β
pˆ
< x0β <
pGx0β
pˆ
.
Let us take the realized highest private signal v1 and second highest signal v2 as given.
Then there are four cases to consider:
(Case 1) v2 >
pGx0β
pˆ ,
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(Case 2) v2 ∈
(
x0β,
pGx0β
pˆ
)
,
(Case 3) v2 ∈
(
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ , x0β
)
,
(Case 4) v2 <
(pBx0−q∆p)β
pˆ .
In Case 1, by Proposition 6,
α (v2) = 1− x0pˆv2 > 1−
1
pGβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2)) = 0 for any w ∈ {G, B} under ND, while
α (v2,w) = 1− x0pwv2 > 1−
1
pwβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2,w)) = 0 for any w ∈ {G, B} under D. This and the fact that a (v2)
and (α (v2,G) , α (v2, B)) are the equilibrium strategies imply that
0 = qpi (v2,G, α (v2,G) , x = 0) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2, B) , x = 0)
= qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 0) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 0) .
By using the definition of pi (v,w, α, x), this reduces to the following:
qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) = pˆα (v2) .
Thus, the interim expected revenue under D can be written as follows:
[qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B)] v1 = pˆα (v2) v1,
which is exactly the interim expected revenue under ND.
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In Case 2, by Proposition 6,
α (v2) = 1− x0 + qpˆv2 + qpGβ ∈
(
1− 1
pBβ
, 1− 1
pGβ
)
and hence x (v1,G, α (v2)) = 1 and x (v1, B, α (v2)) = 0 under ND, while
α (v2,w) = 1− x0pwv2 > 1−
1
pwβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2,w)) = 0 for any w ∈ {G, B} under D. Moreover, we have the
following relationship:
0 = qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 0)
= qpi (v2,G, α (G, v2) , x = 0) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (B, v2) , x = 0)
> qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 0) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 0) ,
where the equalities hold by the break-even conditions of α (v2), α (v2,G), and α (v2, B),
and the inequality holds by x (v2,G, α (v2)) 6= 0 for v2 < pGx0βpˆ . By using the definition of
pi (v,w, α, x), the above inequality implies that
qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) < pˆα (v2) .
This leads to the following:
[qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B)] v1 < pˆα (v2) v1
< pˆα (v2)
(
v1 +
qpG
pˆ
β
)
;
that is, the interim expected revenue under D is smaller than that under ND.
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In Case 3, by Proposition 6,
α (v2) = 1− x0 + qpˆv2 + qpGβ ∈
(
1− 1
pBβ
, 1− 1
pGβ
)
and hence x (v1,G, α (v2)) = 1 and x (v1, B, α (v2)) = 0 under ND, while
α (v2,w) = 1− x0 + 1pw (v2 + β) < 1−
1
pwβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2,w)) = 1 for any w ∈ {G, B} under D. Moreover, we have the
following relationship:
0 = qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 0)
= qpi (v2,G, α (G, v2) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (B, v2) , x = 1)
> qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 1) ,
where the equalities hold by the break-even conditions of α (v2), α (v2,G), and α (v2, B),
and the inequality holds by x (v2, B, α (v2)) 6= 1 for v2 > (pBx0−q∆p)βpˆ . By using the defini-
tion of pi (v,w, α, x), the above inequality implies that
qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) < pˆα (v2) .
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The interim expected revenue under ND minus the interim expected revenue under D is
pˆα (v2)
(
v1 +
qpG
pˆ
β
)
− [qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B)] (v1 + β)
= pˆ
(
1− x0 + q
pˆv2 + qpGβ
)(
v1 +
qpG
pˆ
β
)
−
[
qpG
(
1− x0 + 1
pw (v2 + β)
)
+ (1− q) pB
(
1− x0 + 1
pw (v2 + β)
)]
(v1 + β)
= pˆ
(
1− x0 + q
pˆv2 + qpGβ
)(
v1 +
qpG
pˆ
β
)
−
(
pˆ− x0 + 1
v2 + β
)
(v1 + β)
= − (1− q) (pBβ− 1) + (1− q) (v1 − v2) pˆv2 − (pBx0 − q∆p) β(v2 + β) ( pˆv2 + qpGβ) ,
which is positive if and only if
v1 − v2 ≥ (pBβ− 1) (v2 + β) ( pˆv2 + qpGβ)pˆv2 − (pBx0 − q∆p) β
since pˆv2 > (pBx0 − q∆p) β.
In Case 4, by Proposition 6,
α (v2) = 1− x0 + 1pˆ (v2 + β) < 1−
1
pBβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2)) = 1 for any w ∈ {G, B} under ND, while
α (v2,w) = 1− x0 + 1pw (v2 + β) < 1−
1
pwβ
and hence x (v1,w, α (v2,w)) = 1 for any w ∈ {G, B} under D. This and the fact that a (v2)
and (α (v2,G) , α (v2, B)) are the equilibrium strategies imply that
0 = qpi (v2,G, α (v2,G) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2, B) , x = 1)
= qpi (v2,G, α (v2) , x = 1) + (1− q)pi (v2, B, α (v2) , x = 1) .
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By using the definition of pi (v,w, α, x), this implies that
qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B) = pˆα (v2) .
Thus, the interim expected revenue under D is
[qpGα (v2,G) + (1− q) pBα (v2, B)] (v1 + β) = pˆα (v2) (v1 + β) ,
which is exactly the interim expected revenue under ND. 
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Chapter 3
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in
the Securitization Process.
3.1 Introduction
Lax lending standards and excessive risk-taking are regarded as the main culprits for the
2007-2008 financial crisis (e.g., see Sewell (2011)). Coval et al. (2009a) found evidence
that many structured finance products were overpriced relative to their quality from 2004
to 2007. This may have occurred from errors in evaluating the default probabilities and
their systematic risks as explained in Coval et al. (2009b). However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that many sellers of structured finance products continued to buy assets when
they were aware of their poor quality. They did so because there was a demand for struc-
tured finance products that contained those assets.1 As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
states:
Lenders made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that
could cause massive losses to investors in mortgage securities. As early as
1For instance, Citigroup’s chief executive at the time commented “When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.
We’re still dancing” (Nakamoto and Wighton (2007)).
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September 2004, Countrywide executives recognized that many of the loans
they were originating could result in ‘catastrophic consequences.’ Less than
a year later, they noted that certain high-risk loans they were making could
result not only in foreclosures but also in ‘financial and reputational catastro-
phe’ for the firm. But they did not stop (United States. Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011), p. xxii).
Among the key features of securitizing structured finance products is that issuers have
superior information about the quality of securities they sell and the quality is endoge-
nously chosen by the issuer. Moreover, the repackaging of underlying assets can com-
pound the adverse selection problem by creating more information asymmetry between
the issuer and its investors.2
Extensive studies examine different factors that foster lax lending practices and exces-
sive risk-taking during securitization.3 A great deal of papers examine how managerial
compensation structures influence risk-taking (e.g., see John and John (1993), Chen et al.
(2006), Coles et al. (2006), Bai and Elyasiani (2013), Srivastav et al. (2014), and Brown et al.
(2015)). This study provides an alternative and complementary explanation to previous
papers.
Our goal is to demonstrate how the endogenous quality choice by an issuer who faces
moral hazard affects adverse selection and how additional information asymmetry aris-
ing from repackaging affects adverse selection in the securitization process.
Specifically, we consider a situation in which an issuer can buy either low-value as-
sets at zero cost or medium-value assets at cost c. After buying the low-value assets, it
can issue low-value securities. Similarly, after buying the medium-value assets, it can
2Since most information about the underlying assets in many structured finance products is publicly
available, one might think sophisticated investors can value the repackaged securities properly. However,
Bernardo and Cornell (1997) find wide variations in valuations by sophisticated investors in auctions of
collateralized mortgage obligations, and attribute them to asymmetric information.
3When we refer to “excessive” risk-taking, we mean that the NPV of the activity is insufficient to com-
pensate fully for risk.
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issue medium-value securities. Moreover, after buying the medium-value assets, the is-
suer can repackage at cost ε > 0 to make two types of securities: measure γ ∈ (0, 1)
of high-value securities and measure (1− γ) of the low-value securities. Buyers do not
observe the issuer’s choices. We restrict our attention to a case wherein always buying
the medium-value assets and issuing the medium-value securities without repackaging
is first-best, and repackaging the medium-value assets to make two types of securities
lowers expected values to the issuer and buyers. We assume all parties are risk neutral.
We show that the moral hazard prevents the first-best outcome from being realized in
equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the issuer purchases medium-value assets and
repackages them into separate securities with a positive probability, and under some con-
ditions, making the repackaging available as the issuer’s choice increases its equilibrium
payoff. Repackaging enhances informational advantage about the quality of the securi-
ties being sold.4 Thus, the issuer may rather repackage assets and sell them separately
than pass through assets even when it must incur a socially wasteful cost.
Kawai (2015) and Kawai (2014) are most closely related to this study. They consider
the seller’s endogenous quality choice in dynamic models, andwe present a static version
of those models. However, we allow sellers to repackage assets into separate securities
in the securitization process. In another closely related paper, DeMarzo (2005) considers
a situation wherein an issuer has superior information about the value of its assets, and
shows that pooling and tranching are preferable to pure-pooling when systematic risk
is sufficiently small. However, he does not consider endogenous quality decisions by
issuers.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section 3.3 derives
equilibrium behaviors and discusses their properties. Section 3.4 concludes the study.
Most proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
4Our result re-emphasizes the importance of modeling dynamics in economic situations. It is tempting
to discard choices that are inferior in terms of expected values whenever we consider risk-neutral agents;
however, such choices can be relevant in decision-making and can be selected with a positive probability
in equilibrium.
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3.2 Model
We model the securitization problem with moral hazard and adverse selection. A risk-
neutral issuer (an intermediary) faces a continuum of identical risk-neutral buyers (in-
vestors) of measure 1, each of whom is to buy one unit of the security. In our two stage
model, in stage 2, without observing the issuer’s stage 1 choices that determine the qual-
ity of the security being sold, each buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer m that the
issuer can accept or reject.
In stage 1, the issuer selects one of three alternatives {N, S,R} that determine the
quality of the security to issue. The issuer can buy either medium-value assets at cost c or
low-value assets at zero cost. The issuer can subsequently issue medium-value securities
from medium-value assets and low-value securities from low-value assets.
Choice N signifies that the issuer buys low-value assets and issues securities with a
low value. If N is chosen, the value of the securities issued is viL = 0 to the issuer and
vbL > 0 to the buyers. Choice S signifies that the issuer buys medium-value assets and
issues securities with a medium value. If S is chosen, the value of the security is viM to the
issuer and vbM to the buyers, where v
b
L < v
b
M and 0 < c < v
i
M < v
b
M.
Alternatively, after buyingmedium-value assets, the issuer can repackage at cost ε > 0
to make two types of securities: measure γ ∈ (0, 1) of high-value securities and measure
(1− γ) of low-value securities. This reflects a situation wherein the issuer has and can
use superior information regarding the individual qualities of the medium-value assets.
Choice R signifies that the issuer buys medium-value assets and repackages them, mak-
ing high- and low-value securities. The high-value securities yield viH to the issuer and
vbH to the buyers with v
i
H < v
b
H, whereas the low-value securities are the same as before,
that is, viL = 0 to the issuer and v
b
L > 0 to the buyers. Note that buyers always value
securities higher than the issuer regardless of the issuer’s choice.
We impose the following parametric assumption:
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Assumption 1: (i) γviH = v
i
M, (ii) γv
b
H + (1− γ) vbL ≤ vbM, and (iii) vbM − viM − c > vbL.
Condition (i) implies that the expected combined net value of the high- and low- value
securities to the issuer from choosing R is smaller than from choosing S: γviH − c− ε <
viM − c. This implies that the issuer prefers to choose S with probability 1 when retaining
a security. Condition (ii) states that the expected combined value of the securities to the
buyers for R is no greater than that for S. Conditions (i) and (ii) together imply that
the expected potential gain from trade from R is strictly smaller than that from S. In
this sense, choice R is inferior to choice S and may seem “irrelevant.” Also, condition
(iii) states that the potential gain from trade from choosing S is greater than that from
choosing N. Thus, conditions (i)–(iii) together guarantee that the efficient outcome is that
the issuer always chooses S and a trade always occurs.
Let qN, qS, and qR be the probabilities that the issuer chooses N, S, and R, respectively.
Since each buyer makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer and possible values to the issuer
are
{
0, viM, v
i
H
}
, the buyer never offers m /∈ {0, viM, viH}. So it is sufficient to consider
only m ∈ {0, viM, viH}. Let pH, pM, and pL be the fractions of buyers that offer m = viH,
m = viM, and m = 0, respectively, where pH, pM, pL ≥ 0 and pH + pM + pL = 1.
Given (pH, pM), the issuer’s expected payoffs by choosing N, S, and R are
pii (N; pH, pM) = pHviH + pMv
i
M, (3.1)
pii (S; pH, pM) = pHviH + (1− pH) viM − c, (3.2)
and pii (R; pH, pM) = γviH + (1− γ) pHviH + (1− γ) pMviM − c− ε
= pHviH + (1− pH) viM +
(
viH − viM
)
viM
viH
pM − c− ε, (3.3)
respectively. Also, given (qS, qN, qR) , each buyer’s expected payoffs when he offers m =
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0, viM, v
i
H are
pib (0; qS, qN, qR) = (qR (1− γ) + qN) vbL
=
(
qR
viH − viM
viH
+ qN
)
vbL, (3.4)
pib
(
viM; qS, qN, qR
)
= qSvbM − (1− qRγ) viM + (qR (1− γ) + qN) vbL
= qSvbM + qR
vi2M
viH
− viM +
(
qR
viH − viM
viH
+ qN
)
vbL, (3.5)
and pib
(
viH; qS, qN, qR
)
= qRγvbH + qSv
b
M − viH + (qR (1− γ) + qN) vbL,
= qR
vbHv
i
M
viH
+ qSvbM − viH +
(
qR
viH − viM
viH
+ qN
)
vbL, (3.6)
respectively.
We first consider a situation wherein choice R is excessively costly.
Proposition 11 Suppose ε ≥ (viH − viM) (viM − c) /viH. Then, a unique equilibrium exists. In
equilibrium, (i) the issuer chooses R with probability zero, S with probability qS = viM/v
b
M, and N
with probability 1− qS, and (ii) fraction pM =
(
viM − c
)
/viM of buyers offer v
i
M, and fraction 1−
pM offer 0. Equilibrium payoffs to the issuer and the buyers are viM − c and
(
vbM − viM
)
vbL/v
b
M,
respectively.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which qR = 0. In such an equilibrium
qS ∈ (0, 1), pM ∈ (0, 1), and pH = 0.
By (3.4) and (3.5), the buyer is indifferent between offering 0 and viM if and only if
qS = viM/v
b
M when qR = 0. By (3.1) and (3.2), the issuer is indifferent between N and S if
and only if pM =
(
viM − c
)
/viM when pH = 0.
To see that this actually constitutes an equilibrium, we need to check if the issuer
wants to choose qR = 0 given pM =
(
viM − c
)
/viM and pH = 0. Then by (3.3), the ex-ante
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equilibrium payoff from choosing R is
viM +
(
viH − viM
) (
viM − c
)
viH
− c− ε.
Therefore, the issuer chooses qR = 0 if and only if
viM − c ≥ viM +
(
viH − viM
) (
viM − c
)
viH
− c− ε or ε ≥
(
viH − viM
viH
)(
viM − c
)
.
Due to asymmetric information, moral hazard prevents the issuer from choosing first-
best choice S with probability 1. Note that when ε ≥ (viH − viM)× (viM − c) /viH holds,
R is too costly for the issuer to choose, and the situation is essentially the same when
choice R is unavailable to the issuer. Hereafter, we impose the following assumption to
investigate the effect of choice R:
Assumption 2: Choice R is more costly than N but not excessively:
0 < ε <
viH − viM
viH
(
viM − c
)
.
3.3 Equilibrium
Define the following function:
v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
≡
(
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
) (
viH − viM
)
− viM
(
vbH − viM
) (
vbM − viM
)
.
For the case in which choice R is more costly than N but not excessively, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 12 1. Suppose v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
> 0. Then, the unique equilibrium strategies
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are
(qN, qS, qR) =
(
0, 1− qR,
viH
(
vbM − viM
)
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
,
and (pL, pM, pH) =
(
1− pM, εv
i
H(
viH − viM
)
viM
, 0
)
.
The equilibrium expected payoff is viM − c to the issuer and
(
vbM − viM
) (
viH − viM
) ×
vbL/
(
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
to the buyers.
2. Suppose v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
= 0. Then, the unique equilibrium strategies are
(qN, qS, qR) =
(
0, 1− qR,
viH
(
vbM − viM
)
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
,
and (pL, pM, pH) =
(
1− pM − p∗H,
εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
, p∗H
)
,
where p∗H ≤
(
viH − viM
) (
viM − c
)− εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
.
The equilibrium expected payoff is p∗Hv
i
H +(1− p∗H) viM− c to the issuer and
(
vbM − viM
)×(
viH − viM
)
vbL/
(
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
to the buyers.
3. Suppose v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
< 0. Then, the unique equilibrium strategies are
(qN, qS, qR) =
(
1− qS − qR,
viM
(
vbH − viH
)
vbM
(
vbH − viM
) , viH (viH − viM)
viM
(
vbH − viM
)) ,
and (pL, pM, pH) =
(
c
viM
,
εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
,
(
viH − viM
) (
viM − c
)− εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
)
.
The equilibrium expected payoff is viH
(
viM − c− ε
)
/viM to the issuer and
(
vbM − viM
)×(
viH − viM
)
vbL/
(
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
to the buyers.
Under Assumption 2, choice R is always selected with a positive probability, although
its expected NPV and potential gain from trade are smaller than for choice S. The issuer
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can benefit from repackaging since it amplifies the issuer’s informational advantage about
the quality of the security being issued. Thus, the issuer may rather repackage than pass
through assets, despite having to pay an additional cost.
Let us compare Propositions 11 and 12. Adding R to the issuer’s possible choices de-
creases the buyers’ expected payoffs from
(
vbM − viM
)
vbL/v
b
M to
(
vbM − viM
) (
viH − viM
)×
vbL/
(
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
)
. Moreover, when v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
> 0, adding R does not change the issuer’s expected payoff. When
v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
< 0, adding R increases the issuer’s expected payoff from viM − c to
viH
(
viM − c− ε
)
/viM. Thus, under Assumption 2, when v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
> 0, social
surplus diminishes by making choice R available. However, when v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
< 0
and vbL is sufficiently small, social surplus increases by making R available since the in-
crease in the issuer’s equilibrium payoff dominates the decrease in the buyers’ equilib-
rium payoffs.
3.4 Conclusion
This examination of securitization has considered issuers’ endogenous quality choice
problem in which the quality of securities is unobservable to investors. Our results in-
dicate that issuers succumb to moral hazard and buy low-quality assets even though
doing so is not socially optimal. This finding reinforces previous claims that the sellers
of structured finance products during the global financial crisis continued to buy assets
when they were fully aware of their poor quality.
We also found that issuers repackage assets into separate securities to enjoy additional
informational advantage about the quality of securities and, under certain conditions, re-
ceive a higher equilibrium payoff. Therefore, the issuer would rather repackage assets
and sell them separately than pass through assets so long as the cost incurred in repackag-
ing is not excessive. This advantage created by additional informational asymmetry can
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partially explain the popularity of structured finance products.
3.5 Proofs of Chapter 3
To prove Proposition 12, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 13 Under Assumption 2, any equilibrium strategy must satisfy the following: (i) qR ∈
(0, 1) and qS > 0, (ii) pL > 0 and pM > 0, and (iii) qN > 0⇒ pH > 0.
Proof. Proof of (i): We first show that there is no equilibrium in which qR = 1. Suppose
qR = 1. Then pM = 0. However, it follows from (3.2) and (3.3) that when pM = 0,
pii (R; pH, pM = 0) < pii (S; pH, pM = 0) ,
which contradicts qR = 1.
We have shown that qR = 0 is not an equilibrium under Assumption 2 in the proof of
Proposition 11. Therefore, qR ∈ (0, 1) in any equilibrium.
Next we prove qS > 0. Suppose otherwise. Then pM = 0. It then follows that
pii (S; pH, pM = 0) > pii (R; pH, pM = 0), which contradicts qR ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of (ii): Suppose pL = 0. Then pM = 1− pH and it follows that
pii (N; pH, pM = 1− pH) > pii (S; pH, pM = 1− pH) ,
which contradicts qS > 0. Next, if pM = 0, then
pii (S; pH, pM = 0) > pii (R; pH, pM = 0) ,
which contradicts qR > 0.
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Proof of (iii): Suppose pH = 0. By (i), pii (S; pH, pM) = pii (R; pH, pM), or
pM =
εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
<
viM − c
viM
,
where the inequality holds by Assumption 2. Therefore, the following inequality holds:
pii (N; pH = 0, pM)− pii (S; pH = 0, pM) = pMviM − (viM − c) < 0,
hence qN = 0.
Lemma 14 Under Assumption 2, any equilibrium strategy must satisfy the following:
pM =
εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
(3.7)
pH ≤
(
viH − viM
) (
viM − c
)− εviH(
viH − viM
)
viM
, (3.8)
where the equality holds if qN > 0.
qS =
viM
vbM
(
1− qR v
i
M
viH
)
(3.9)
qR ≤
viH
(
viH − viM
)
viM
(
vbH − viM
) , (3.10)
where the equality holds if pH > 0.
Proof. Since qR > 0 and qS > 0, we have
pii (S; pH, pM) = pii (R; pH, pM) and pii (S; pH, pM) ≥ pii (N; pH, pM) .
Rearranging gives (3.7) and (3.8).
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Similarly, it follows by pM > 0 and pL > 0 that
pib (0; qS, qN, qR) = pib
(
viM; qS, qN, qR
)
and pib (0; qS, qN, qR) ≥ pib
(
viH; qS, qN, qR
)
,
which implies that (3.9) and (3.10).
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 12. Let us first show that the stated set of
strategies constitutes an equilibrium. Suppose pM =
εviH
(viH−viM)viM
. Then, from (3.1)–(3.3) it
follows that
pii (S; pH, pM) = pii (R; pH, pM) ≥ pii (N; pH, pM) ,
where the inequality holds if and only if pH <
(viH−viM)(viM−c)−εviH
(viH−viM)viM
and the equality holds
if and only if pH =
(viH−viM)(viM−c)−εviH
(viH−viM)viM
.
Suppose (qN, qS, qR) =
(
0, 1− qR, v
i
H(vbM−viM)
vbMv
i
H−vi2M
)
. Then, from (3.4)–(3.6) it follows that
pib (0; qS, qN, qR) = pib
(
viM; qS, qN, qR
)
≥ pib
(
viH; qS, qN, qR
)
,
where the equality holds if and only if v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
= 0 and the inequality holds if
and only if v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
> 0. Moreover, suppose
(qN, qS, qR) =
(
1− qS − qR,
viM
(
vbH − viH
)
vbM
(
vbH − viM
) , viH (viH − viM)
viM
(
vbH − viM
)) .
Then, from (3.4)–(3.6) it follows that
pib (0; qS, qN, qR) = pib
(
viM; qS, qN, qR
)
= pib
(
viH; qS, qN, qR
)
.
Thus, the stated set of strategies indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
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Next, let us show the uniqueness. By the above series of lemmas, the only possible
equilibrium strategies are:
1. pM, pL, qR, qS ∈ (0, 1) and pH = qN = 0.
2. pH, pM, pL, qR, qS ∈ (0, 1) and qN = 0.
3. pH, pM, pL, qN, qR, qS ∈ (0, 1).
Strategies (1) and (2): Suppose qN = 0. By 1 = qS + qR and (3.9), it follows
qR =
viH
(
vbM − viM
)
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
.
Then, (3.10) can be written as
viH
(
viH − viM
)
viM
(
vbH − viM
) − viH (vbM − viM)
vbMv
i
H − vi2M
≥ 0
or
v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
≥ 0,
where the equality holds if and only if pH > 0.
Strategy (3): Suppose pH > 0 and qN > 0. Then, the equalities must hold in (3.8) and
(3.10). It follows that
1− qR − qS
=
vbMv
i
M
(
vbH − viM
)− vbMviH (viH − viM)− vi2M (vbH − viH)
vbMv
i
M
(
vbH − viM
)
> 0,
which implies v
(
viM, v
i
H, v
b
M, v
b
H
)
< 0. Therefore, the stated set of strategies is indeed
unique. 
47
Bibliography
Abhishek, Vineet, Bruce Hajek, and Steven R. Williams (2015), “On bidding with securi-
ties: Risk aversion and positive dependence.” Games and Economic Behavior, 90, 66–80.
Bai, Gang and Elyas Elyasiani (2013), “Bank stability and managerial compensation.”
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37, 799 – 813.
Bergemann, Dirk and Martin Pesendorfer (2007), “Information structures in optimal auc-
tions.” Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 580–609.
Bernardo, Antonio E and Bradford Cornell (1997), “The valuation of complex derivatives
by major investment firms: Empirical evidence.” The Journal of Finance, 52, 785–798.
Board, Simon (2009), “Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect.” Economic
Theory, 38, 125–135.
Brown, Kareen, Ranjini Jha, and Parunchana Pacharn (2015), “Ex ante CEO severance pay
and risk-taking in the financial services sector.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 59, 111 –
126.
Che, Yeon-Koo and Jinwoo Kim (2010), “Bidding with securities: comment.” American
Economic Review, 100, 1929–1935.
Chen, Carl R., Thomas L. Steiner, and AnnMarie Whyte (2006), “Does stock option-based
executive compensation induce risk-taking? an analysis of the banking industry.” Jour-
nal of Banking & Finance, 30, 915 – 945.
48
Coles, Jeffrey L., Naveen D. Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen (2006), “Managerial incentives
and risk-taking.” Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 431 – 468.
Coval, Joshua D, Jakub W Jurek, and Erik Stafford (2009a), “Economic catastrophe
bonds.” The American Economic Review, 99, 628 – 666.
Coval, Joshua D, Jakub W Jurek, and Erik Stafford (2009b), “The economics of structured
finance.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, 3–25.
DeMarzo, Peter M (2005), “The pooling and tranching of securities: A model of informed
intermediation.” Review of Financial Studies, 18, 1–35.
DeMarzo, Peter M., Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005), “Bidding with securities:
Auctions and security design.” The American Economic Review, 95, 936–959.
Fang, Hanming and Sergio O Parreiras (2003), “On the failure of the linkage principle
with financially constrained bidders.” Journal of Economic Theory, 110, 374–392.
Fishman, Michael J (1989), “Preemptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange
in acquisitions.” Journal of Finance, 44, 41–57.
Gorbenko, Alexander S. and Andrey Malenko (2011), “Competition among sellers in se-
curities auctions.” American Economic Review, 101, 1806–41.
Hansen, Robert G (1985), “Auctions with contingent payments.” American Economic Re-
view, 75, 862–865.
John, Teresa A. and Kose John (1993), “Top-management compensation and capital struc-
ture.” The Journal of Finance, 48, 949–974.
Kawai, Keiichi (2014), “Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by
the seller.” Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 152–162.
49
Kawai, Keiichi (2015), “Reputation for quality and adverse selection.” European Economic
Review, 76, 47–59.
Kogan, Shimon and John Morgan (2010), “Securities auctions under moral hazard: An
experimental study.” Review of Finance, 14, 477–520.
Liu, Tingjun (2015), “Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders.”
Mares, Vlad and Ronald M Harstad (2003), “Private information revelation in common-
value auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory, 109, 264–282.
Milgrom, Paul R and Robert J Weber (1982), “A theory of auctions and competitive bid-
ding.” Econometrica, 50, 1089–1122.
Nakamoto, Michiyo and David Wighton (2007), “Citigroup chief stays bullish on buy-
outs.” Financial Times, 9.
Perry, Motty and Philip J Reny (1999), “On the failure of the linkage principle inmulti-unit
auctions.” Econometrica, 67, 895–900.
Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew and S Viswanathan (2000), “Corporate reorganizations and non-
cash auctions.” Journal of Finance, 55, 1807–1854.
Rothkopf, Michael H. and Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1992), “Innovative approaches
to competitive mineral leasing.” Resources and Energy, 14, 233 – 248.
Samuelson, W.F. (1985), “Competitive bidding with entry costs.” Economics Letters, 17,
53–57.
Sewell, Chan (2011), “Financial crisis was avoidable, inquiry finds.” New York Times, Jan-
uary 25.
Skrzypacz, Andrzej (2013), “Auctions with contingent payments-an overview.” Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 666–675.
50
Srivastav, Abhishek, Seth Armitage, and Jens Hagendorff (2014), “CEO inside debt hold-
ings and risk-shifting: Evidence from bank payout policies.” Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance, 47, 41 – 53.
United States. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), “Financial crisis inquiry re-
port: final report of the national commission on the causes of the financial and economic
crisis in the United States.” US Government Printing Office.
51
